权威报告

CHN201172.E

China: Situation of Hui Muslims and theirtreatment by society and authorities; state protection (2020–September 2022)
Information on the current situation on Hui Muslims in China was scarce amongthe sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraintsof this Response.
In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a senior researcherwith Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), "a coalition of Chinese andinternational human rights organizations" which "investigates andmonitors the human rights situation in China" (CHRD n.d.), noted that inXinjiang "all" Muslim groups are affected by the"crackdown"; "some" religious practices of Hui Muslims inXinjiang are prohibited and there is surveillance of individuals suspected ofengaging in religious activities and/or observing rules and behaviours relatedto Islam such as not drinking alcohol and wearing a beard (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022).The same source further stated that Hui Muslims found not to be respecting the"sanitized" Islam imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)"could" be sent to re-education camps (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022). The NewEurope article states that rights groups have reported that Hui Muslims inXinjiang "are now being targeted" and have been sent to"re-education camps with the Uyghurs [Uighurs, Uygurs]" (New Europe13 Feb. 2020). Similarly, the CECC states that Hui Muslims are detained inXinjiang's "mass internment camps" (US 29 Mar. 2021, 2).

Hui Muslims face "increasing"discrimination and islamophobia, although it varies by region (AssociateProfessor 20 Sept. 2022). In a telephone interview with the ResearchDirectorate, the CHRD Senior Researcher indicated that the living conditions ofHui Muslims in China were relatively good until 2016 when a "politicalcrackdown" began which was followed by the campaign of "Islamsinicization" (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022).

CHN201172.E 中国：回族穆斯林的情况及其受到社会和当局的对待；国家保护（2020年-2022年9月）

研究处在本次回应的时间限制内咨询的消息来源中，关于中国回族穆斯林现状的信息较为稀少。

在与研究处的电话采访中，中国人权捍卫者联盟（CHRD）的高级研究员指出，在新疆“所有”穆斯林群体都受到“镇压”的影响；回族穆斯林的“某些”宗教活动在新疆被禁止，且个人被怀疑参与宗教活动或遵守伊斯兰相关的规则和行为（如不饮酒和蓄须）会受到监视。CHRD进一步表示，不尊重中共强加的“净化”伊斯兰的回族穆斯林“可能”会被送往再教育营。New Europe的文章指出，维权团体报告称，新疆的回族穆斯林“现在被针对”，并被送往“与维吾尔族人一起的再教育营”。同样，美国国会及行政部门中国委员会（CECC）表示，新疆的“集中营”中关押着回族穆斯林。

回族穆斯林面临“越来越多”的歧视和伊斯兰恐惧症，尽管这因地区而异(副教授，2022年9月20日)。在与研究局的电话采访中，中国人权中心高级研究员表示，在2016年“政治镇压”开始之前，回族穆斯林在中国的生活条件相对较好，随后开始了“伊斯兰教中国化”运动(CHRD 2022年9月20日)。

Sinicization of Islam Policy
The Economist, a British weekly magazine that covers topics includingtechnology, geopolitics, finance and economics (The Economist n.d.), reportsthat in 2016 the government's "attitude towards Muslims" began tochange, with China's leader Xi Jinping drawing up plans for the"'sinicisation'" of China's religions (The Economist 26 Sept. 2019).The same source notes that, alongside Christianity, Islam was a "maintarge[t]" for sinicization due its "strong overseas connections";officials "set out to purge" both religions "of foreigninfluences deemed threatening to the Communist Party" and, in Islam'scase, to "prevent the spread of radicalism" (The Economist 26 Sept.2019). A 2019 article by Radio Free Asia (RFA), a non-profit broadcastingcorporation funded by the US Congress (RFA n.d.), reported in 2019 that Chinawas "developing a five-year plan for the 'sinicization' of Islam,according to the country's government-backed China Islamic Association[1]" (RFA 7 Jan. 2019). The same source indicates that according to areport on the China Islamic Association's website, representatives of localIslamic associations [2] from eight provinces and regions, including Beijing,Shanghai, Hunan, Yunnan, and Qinghai, discussed the plan at a meeting held bythe CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD), during which the China IslamicAssociation's president said that the plan "will focus on requiringmosques to uphold 'core values of socialism, traditional culture, laws andregulations'" (RFA 7 Jan. 2019). The RFA cites the Association presidentas stating that mosques will be told to "'guide, mobilize and inspire'Chinese Muslims with lectures and training sessions on such topics" andthat these should "uphold the spirit of a sinicized Islam by usingexamples of notable figures" (RFA 7 Jan. 2019). Among the behavioursencouraged as a part of the sinicization of Islam, the CHRD Senior Researchernoted that the authorities are asking men to shave their long beards and womento remove their veils and head scarves in public spaces, while both are told toabandon their religious clothing in favour of traditional Chinese dress (CHRD20 Sept. 2022). Corroborating information could not be found among the sourcesconsulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of thisResponse.

伊斯兰教中国化政策

英国周刊《经济学人》报道，2016年政府对穆斯林的态度开始改变，中国领导人习近平制定了中国宗教的“本土化”计划。该报道指出，基督教和伊斯兰教由于“与海外的强大联系”成为主要目标；官员们“着手清除”这两种宗教中的“被认为对共产党构成威胁的外国影响”，并防止伊斯兰教的“激进化”传播。

自由亚洲电台（RFA）2019年的一篇文章指出，中国正在制定一个为期五年的伊斯兰教中国化计划。根据中国伊斯兰教协会网站的报道，来自北京、上海、湖南、云南和青海等八个省份和地区的地方伊斯兰教协会代表在中共统战部（UFWD）主持的会议上讨论了该计划。中国伊斯兰教协会会长表示，该计划将重点要求清真寺坚持“社会主义核心价值观、传统文化、法律法规”。

RFA引用协会会长的话称，清真寺将通过讲座和培训课程“引导、动员和激励”中国穆斯林，并以著名人物为例，弘扬中国化伊斯兰教的精神。CHRD的高级研究员指出，作为伊斯兰教中国化的一部分，政府要求男性剃掉长胡须，女性在公共场所摘掉面纱和头巾，同时要求他们放弃宗教服装，改穿传统中国服饰。

According to the CECC, "official Chinese governmentrhetoric and policy has become less tolerant toward practice and expression ofIslamic identity among Hui Muslim individuals and communities" andrestrictions on the practice of Islam among Hui Muslims are "increasinglysimilar to restrictions experienced by Uyghurs and other Muslimminorities" in the Xinjiang (US 29 Mar. 2021, 2). The same source notesthat "[t]his policy shift is due in part to Chinese officials' conflationof Islamic identity with extremism and the Chinese government campaign to'sinicize' Islam" (US 29 Mar. 2021, 2). The Economist indicates that oneobjective of the sinicization campaign was to "reduce visible links"between Islam in China and in the Arab world (The Economist 26 Sept. 2019). ANew York Times article reports that in northwestern China, including in Linxia,Inner Mongolia, Henan, and Ningxia, authorities "destroyed domes andminarets on mosques," and in Yunnan province three mosques were closed(The New York Times 22 Sept. 2019). The same source notes that the provincialgovernment in Ningxia "banned public displays of Arabic script" andthat this ban was subsequently adopted in Beijing and other parts of thecountry (The New York Times 22 Sept. 2019). The New York Times article alsoreports that Ningxia and Gansu have "banned the traditional call toprayer" and that an imam in Yinchuan, Ningxia's capital, was visited byauthorities who "warned him to make no public statements on religiousmatters" (The New York Times 22 Sept. 2019). According to the same source,in Yunnan, "where there have long been Hui communities," in December2018 authorities "padlocked" mosques in three villages that had beenoperating without official permission (The New York Times 22 Sept. 2019). TheRFA also notes that in Yunnan province in December 2018, Hui Muslims were"raided and forcibly evicted" from three mosques for "engag[ing]in 'illegal religious activities'," with "[l]ocal Hui Muslims blam[ing]the crackdown on the local Islamic Association's compliance with governmentdirectives" (RFA 7 Jan. 2019). According to RFA, citing a US-based Muslimactivist, "'[t]he sinicization of Islam is mostly targeted at HuiMuslims'" (RFA 7 Jan. 2019). According to Bitter Winter [3],

[s]ince the new Regulation on Religious Affairs came into force in February2018, the government has been implementing [a] "de-Arabization andde-Saudization" campaign in Ningxia and other Muslim-populated regions ofChina. In late June, the Ningxia authorities proclaimed that "allreligious activity venues highlighting Arabic style must be graduallyrectified. New buildings or any other constructions that are expanded orrebuilt – anywhere across the region – must highlight the Chinese style."(Bitter Winter 2 Jan. 2020)

据美国国会及行政当局中国委员会称，“中国政府官方的言论和政策对回族穆斯林个人和社区的伊斯兰身份实践和表达越来越不宽容”，对回族穆斯林信奉伊斯兰教的限制“越来越类似于新疆维吾尔族和其他穆斯林少数民族所经历的限制”（美国 2021 年 3 月 29 日，第 2 页）。同一消息来源指出，“这一政策转变部分归因于中国官员将伊斯兰身份与极端主义混为一谈，以及中国政府‘中国化’伊斯兰教的运动”（美国 2021 年 3 月 29 日，第 2 页）。《经济学人》指出，中国化运动的一个目标是“减少中国伊斯兰教与阿拉伯世界之间的明显联系”（《经济学人》 2019 年 9 月 26 日）。《纽约时报》的一篇文章报道称，在中国西北部，包括临夏、内蒙古、河南和宁夏，当局“摧毁了清真寺的圆顶和宣礼塔”，云南省关闭了三座清真寺（《纽约时报》 2019 年 9 月 22 日）。同一消息来源指出，宁夏省政府“禁止公开展示阿拉伯文字”，北京和全国其他地区随后也采取了这一禁令（《纽约时报》 2019 年 9 月 22 日）。《纽约时报》的文章还报道称，宁夏和甘肃“禁止传统的祈祷方式”，宁夏首府银川的一名阿訇遭到当局的拜访，当局“警告他不要公开发表有关宗教问题的言论”（《纽约时报》 2019 年 9 月 22 日）。据同一消息来源称，在“长期以来一直存在回族社区”的云南，2018年 12 月当局“封锁”了三个未经官方许可而开放的清真寺（《纽约时报》 2019 年 9 月 22 日）。自由亚洲电台还指出，2018 年 12 月，在云南省，回族穆斯林因“从事‘非法宗教活动’”而“被突击并被强行驱逐”，“当地回族穆斯林将镇压归咎于当地伊斯兰教协会遵守政府指令”（自由亚洲电台 2019 年 1 月 7 日）。据自由亚洲电台援引一位美国穆斯林活动人士的话称，“伊斯兰教中国化主要针对的是回族穆斯林”（自由亚洲电台 2019 年 1 月 7 日）。据《寒冬》[3] 报道，
自 2018 年 2 月新《宗教事务条例》生效以来，政府一直在宁夏和中国其他穆斯林聚居地区实施“去阿拉伯化和去沙特化”运动。6 月底，宁夏当局宣布“所有突出阿拉伯风格的宗教活动场所必须逐步整顿。该地区任何地方的新建或扩建或重建的任何建筑都必须突出中国风格。”（《寒冬》2020 年 1 月 2 日）

[s]ince the new Regulation on Religious Affairs came intoforce in February 2018, the government has been implementing [a]"de-Arabization and de-Saudization" campaign in Ningxia and otherMuslim-populated regions of China. In late June, the Ningxia authoritiesproclaimed that "all religious activity venues highlighting Arabic stylemust be gradually rectified. New buildings or any other constructions that areexpanded or rebuilt – anywhere across the region – must highlight the Chinese style."(Bitter Winter 2 Jan. 2020)
Bitter Winter reports that in 2018 the Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia'sTongxin county was "remodeled into a Chinese style building, its dome andminarets replaced with Chinese style pagodas" after"[t]housands" of Hui Muslims protested to prevent its demolition bythe Chinese government in August 2018 (Bitter Winter 2 Jan. 2020). NPR alsoindicates that in August 2018 in Tongxin, authorities tried to demolish WeizhouGrand Mosque, "claiming it lacked the right building permits," butfollowing protests officials called off the demolition (NPR 26 Sept. 2019). Thesame source reports, however, that in November 2018, local government workunits visited "every household" in Weizhou and "pressur[ed]residents to sign letters stating their acquiescence to 'renovate' the mosqueby removing its main dome and domed minarets," and, "[i]n some cases,Weizhou officials threatened to fire state employees" if they refused tosign the letter (NPR 26 Sept. 2019).

《寒冬》报道称，2018 年，宁夏同心县韦州清真大寺“被改建成中式建筑，圆顶和宣礼塔被中式宝塔取代”，此前“数千名”回族穆斯林于 2018 年 8 月抗议中国政府拆除该寺（《寒冬》2020 年 1 月 2 日）。NPR 还指出，2018 年 8 月，同心县当局试图拆除韦州清真大寺，“声称其缺乏正确的建筑许可证”，但在抗议活动爆发后，官员取消了拆除行动（NPR 2019 年 9 月 26 日）。但同一消息来源还报告称，2018 年 11 月，当地政府工作单位走访了韦州的“每户人家”，“向居民施压，要求他们签署同意‘翻修’清真寺的信件，拆除其主圆顶和圆顶尖塔”，并且“在某些情况下，韦州官员还威胁说，如果他们拒绝签署信件，就解雇公务员”（NPR，2019 年 9 月 26 日）。

The information in the following paragraph was provided byNPR:

Mosques "have become the major vehicle" for the sinification of theHui. In April 2018, officials "began revoking" the licences issued bythe state to imams with residency from a different province than the one inwhich they practice and for imams who have studied overseas. "In Ningxia,smaller mosques without licensed imams have been closed outright." Imamsin Henan and Ningxia are now required to attend monthly training sessions and,according to imams interviewed by NPR, at these training sessions "theyare taught Communist ideology and state ethnic policy and discuss Xi Jinping'sspeeches." Imams are also required to pass an exam assessing their"ideological knowledge" to renew their license annually (NPR 26 Sept.2019).
The information in the following paragraph was provided in a 2020 article byAgence France-Presse (AFP):
In Linxia, the CCP "has banned minors under 16 from religious activitiesor study" and local authorities have also "severely" restrictedthe number of students over 16 who are officially permitted to study in eachmosque and have "limited certification processes for new imams." InJanuary 2021, local officials in Linxia signed a degree "pledging to ensurethat no individual or organisation would 'support, permit, organise or guideminors towards entering mosques for Koranic study or religious activities', orpush them towards religious beliefs." Imams were asked to agree inwriting, with one refusing resulting in the "fury" of officials andbeing "shunned" by his colleagues. According to a caretaker at thelocal mosque, inspectors checked the premises "every few days" duringthe school holiday to "ensure none of the 70 or so village boys were present."Local authorities have also "instructed mosques to display national flagsand stop sounding the call to prayer to reduce 'noise pollution' – withloudspeakers removed entirely from 335 mosques" (AFP 1 Apr. 2020).

以下段落中的信息由 NPR 提供：
清真寺“已成为回族中国化的主要工具”。2018 年 4 月，官员“开始吊销”国家向居住在其所在省份以外的阿訇和在海外学习过的阿訇颁发的执照。“在宁夏，没有执照阿訇的小型清真寺已被彻底关闭。”河南和宁夏的阿訇现在必须参加每月的培训课程，据 NPR 采访的阿訇说，在这些培训课程上，“他们学习共产主义意识形态和国家民族政策，并讨论习近平的讲话。”阿訇还必须通过一项评估其“意识形态知识”的考试，才能每年更新其执照（NPR 2019 年 9 月 26 日）。
以下段落中的信息来自法新社（AFP） 2020 年的一篇文章：
在临夏，中共“禁止 16 岁以下未成年人参加宗教活动或学习”，地方当局还“严格”限制每个清真寺正式允许学习的 16 岁以上学生人数，并“限制新阿訇的认证程序”。2021 年 1 月，临夏当地官员签署了一份承诺书，“承诺确保任何个人或组织都不会‘支持、允许、组织或引导未成年人进入清真寺学习《古兰经》或从事宗教活动’，或强迫他们信奉宗教”。伊玛目被要求以书面形式同意，其中一名伊玛目拒绝了，导致官员“大发雷霆”，并被同事“疏远”。据当地清真寺的一名看守说，在学校放假期间，检查人员“每隔几天”就会检查清真寺，以“确保村里 70 多个男孩都不在场”。地方当局还“指示清真寺悬挂国旗，停止发出祈祷声，以减少‘噪音污染’——335 座清真寺的扩音器已被彻底拆除”（法新社 2020 年 4 月 1 日）。

Treatment of Hui Muslims in Chinese Society
Information on the treatment of Hui Muslims in the Chinese society was scarceamong the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the timeconstraints of this Response.
The Associate Professor stated that Hui are subject to local socialdiscrimination and that the "big problem" faced by Hui Muslim is the"high level" of islamophobia in Chinese society; individuals who donot hide their religious practices or who show outward signs of Muslim identityrisk social discrimination and "different forms of violence"(Associate Professor 20 Sept. 2022). FP also noted in 2019 that Islamophobiahad "grown over the [previous] four years" and, as a result, Muslimrestaurants were "increasingly removing any public display of theirfaith" such as "Arabic writing and images of famous mosques" (FP5 Jan. 2019).

According to the Associate Professor, "for the most part," the"mistreatment and discrimination" experienced by Hui Muslims isinitiated locally by their neighbours, who know their religion even if attemptthey hide it in order to avoid being targeted (Associate Professor 20 Sept.2022). The same source also indicated that Hui Muslims are "most exposedto hatred and violence" in rural and semi-rural areas of the Northwest,where Hui Muslims are concentrated, because the Han people living in theseautonomous regions know how to identify Muslims, making them "eas[y]"to target; the risk of being targeted is lower in large cities elsewhere in thecountry (Associate Professor 20 Sept. 2022).
The CHRD Senior Researcher noted that there is variation in the treatment ofHui Muslims by society depending on the geographic area and that "socialdiscrimination and harassment" for Hui Muslims is worse in Xinjiang (CHRD20 Sept. 2022). The same source noted that there are "a lot of"online smear campaigns about Muslims that "may become explicitlyextremist" (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022).
Regarding treatment of Hui Muslims by society, the Adjunct Professor indicatedthat Hui Muslims "across China," including the Northwest, "livepeacefully," adding that the Chinese government has "manyreasons" to avoid provoking "animosity" among the Hui Muslimcommunity, including the community's ancestral ties to the Gulf states (AdjunctProfessor 22 Sept. 2022). The source further notes that the Chinese governmentwishes to send a "message to the rest of the world that the State is onlyopposed to separatism, not [to] Islam or Muslims" (Adjunct Professor 22Sept. 2022).
According to the Associate Professor, the access of Hui Muslims to education,employment, housing, and health care depends on local circumstances and thespecific areas where they live, but when they hide signs of their faith andreligious practices outside mosques, they are generally allowed to accesseducation, healthcare, housing, and employment (Associate Professor 20 Sept.2022). The CHRD Senior Researcher also stated that access to education,employment, housing, and healthcare for Hui Muslims varies between regions(CHRD 20 Sept. 2022).
The Associate Professor indicated that Hui Muslims can access education and canattend public schools (Associate Professor 20 Sept. 2022). The CHRD SeniorResearcher noted that regarding access to education, it is "increasinglyforbidden" to attend schools within mosques even when it is not religiouseducation. The same source described a case in Ningxia where some Hui Muslimsattempted to run a private underground school and when this was discovered byauthorities in March 2021, students were detained and interrogated and thethree teachers who started the school were arrested; one of them remains indetention as of September 2022 (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022). The same source furtherstated that the "main" issue in terms of access to education is thatHui Muslims are required to attend public schools, and in public schools theyare not allowed to wear their "usual" clothes and are not providedwith halal food; expressions of religion have been prohibited (CHRD 20 Sept.2022).
The Associate Professor stated regarding employment that "for the mostpart" Hui Muslims are "encouraged" to go into civil service andinto business but "discouraged" from going into religious professions(Associate Professor 20 Sept. 2022). The CHRD Senior Researcher noted thatemployees in the public sector and large enterprises "have to"renounce their Islamic religious practices (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022).

中国社会对回族穆斯林的待遇
在本回应的时间限制内，研究局所查阅的资料中，有关回族穆斯林在中国社会所受待遇的信息很少。
副教授表示，回族穆斯林受到当地社会歧视，回族穆斯林面临的“大问题”是中国社会对伊斯兰教的“高度”恐惧；不隐瞒宗教习俗或表现出穆斯林身份的人面临社会歧视和“不同形式的暴力”的风险（副教授2022 年 9 月 20 日）。FP还在2019年指出，对伊斯兰教的恐惧“在过去四年中有所增长”，因此，穆斯林餐厅“越来越多地取消任何公开展示其信仰的东西”，例如“阿拉伯文字和著名清真寺的图像”（FP 2019 年 1 月 5 日）。
据这位副教授称，“大多数情况下”，回族穆斯林所遭受的“虐待和歧视”都是由当地的邻居发起的，邻居知道他们的宗教信仰，尽管他们试图隐藏宗教信仰以避免成为攻击目标（副教授 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。同一消息来源还指出，回族穆斯林在西北农村和半农村地区“最容易遭受仇恨和暴力”，因为这些自治区居住的汉族人知道如何识别穆斯林，使他们“容易”成为攻击目标；在该国其他大城市，被攻击的风险较低（副教授 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。
CHRD 高级研究员指出，社会对回族穆斯林的待遇因地理区域而异，新疆对回族穆斯林的“社会歧视和骚扰”更为严重（CHRD 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。同一消息来源指出，网上有“大量”针对穆斯林的抹黑活动，“可能变得明显极端化”（CHRD 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。
关于社会对回族穆斯林的态度，这位兼职教授指出，包括西北地区在内的“中国各地”的回族穆斯林“和平地生活”，并补充说，中国政府有“许多理由”避免在回族穆斯林社区中挑起“敌意”，包括该社区与海湾国家的祖先关系（兼职教授 2022 年 9 月 22 日）。消息人士进一步指出，中国政府希望向“世界其他国家传递一个信息，即国家只反对分裂主义，而不是反对伊斯兰教或穆斯林”（兼职教授 2022 年 9 月 22 日）。
副教授表示，回族穆斯林获得教育、就业、住房和医疗保健的机会取决于当地情况和他们居住的具体地区，但当他们在清真寺外隐藏信仰和宗教习俗的迹象时，他们通常被允许获得教育、医疗保健、住房和就业机会（副教授 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。CHRD 高级研究员还表示，回族穆斯林获得教育、就业、住房和医疗保健的机会因地区而异（CHRD2022 年 9 月 20 日）。
副教授表示，回族穆斯林可以接受教育，可以上公立学校（副教授 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。CHRD 高级研究员指出，关于接受教育，即使不是宗教教育，也“越来越禁止”在清真寺内上学。同一消息来源描述了宁夏的一个案例，一些回族穆斯林试图开办一所私立地下学校，当当局于 2021 年 3 月发现此事时，学生被拘留和审讯，开办该学校的三名教师被捕；截至 2022 年 9 月，其中一人仍被拘留（CHRD 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。同一消息来源进一步指出，接受教育方面的“主要”问题是回族穆斯林必须上公立学校，而在公立学校，他们不允许穿“平常”的衣服，也不提供清真食品；禁止表达宗教信仰（CHRD 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。
副教授就就业问题表示，“大多数情况下”回族穆斯林“被鼓励”从事公务员和经商，但“不鼓励”从事宗教职业（副教授 2022 年 9月 20 日）。CHRD 高级研究员指出，公共部门和大型企业的员工“必须”放弃他们的伊斯兰宗教习俗（CHRD2022 年 9 月 20 日）。

Treatment of Hui Muslims by Chinese Authorities
Information on the treatment of Hui Muslims by the Chinese authorities wasscarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the timeconstraints of this Response.
Freedom House's 2022 report states that "[p]eaceful religious practicesare routinely punished under charges of 'religious extremism', resulting indetention, prison sentences, and indoctrination for many … Hui Muslims"(Freedom House 28 Feb. 2022, Sec. D2).
The CECC annual report for 2021 notes that "[o]fficials in areas withlarge Hui populations continued to implement policies and restrictions limitingHui Muslims' ability to practice their religion and culture" and thatauthorities destroyed Hui mosques, placed Hui scholars and religious leaders indetention and under surveillance, and ordered the removal of Arabic religiousinscriptions from Hui Muslim homes and businesses (US 21 Mar. 2022, 12). Thesame source reports that "[t]here is evidence that authorities have begunusing mass surveillance technologies and systems first implemented in[Xinjiang] in other areas of the country with sizable Hui populations" (US21 Mar. 2022, 12).

中国当局对待回族穆斯林的方式
在本回应的时间限制内，研究局所咨询的消息来源中，有关中国当局如何对待回族穆斯林的信息很少。
自由之家 2022 年报告指出，“和平的宗教活动经常受到‘宗教极端主义’的指控而受到惩罚，导致许多……回族穆斯林被拘留、判刑和灌输思想”（自由之家 2022 年 2 月 28 日，第 D2 节）。
美国国会与行政委员会 2021 年年度报告指出，“回族人口众多地区的官员继续实施限制回族穆斯林信奉宗教和文化的政策和限制”，当局摧毁回族清真寺，拘留和监视回族学者和宗教领袖，并下令从回族穆斯林家庭和企业中移除阿拉伯宗教铭文（美国 2022 年 3 月 21 日，第 12 页）。同一消息来源报告称，“有证据表明，当局已开始在该国其他回族人口众多的地区使用首先在 [新疆] 实施的大规模监视技术和系统”（美国 2022 年 3 月 21 日，第 12 页）。

 the Senior Researcher stated that authorities"abuse" Hui Muslims and "increasingly" deny them the rightto freedom of religious conscience, especially in Xinjiang and Ningxia (CHRD 20Sept. 2022). The same source also noted that in Xinjiang and Ningxia, peopleare monitored and are not permitted to leave the country as they are requiredto turn their passports over to authorities (CHRD 20 Sept. 2022). The samesource further stated that over the "last years," Hui Muslims have"frequently" been harassed or detained by police, with the"extremity of police actions" being the most severe in Xinjiang (CHRD20 Sept. 2022). NPR also notes that since April 2019, the "samerestrictions that preceded the Xinjiang crackdown on Uighur Muslims are nowappearing in Hui-dominated regions" with forced renovations or shutteringof Hui mosques, demolition of schools and imprisonment of religious communityleaders and with "increasing" detentions of Hui who have travelledinternationally (NPR 26 Sept. 2019). According to AFP, Hui Muslims in Linxianow fear "similar surveillance and repression" to that previouslyexperienced by the Uighurs in Xinjiang (AFP 1 Apr. 2020). Similarly, FPindicates also that Hui Muslims are "'very afraid to be next, after theUighur'" with Hui Muslims having already been subject to"attacks" by "'anti-halal' groups" (FP 5 Jan. 2019).
The CECC report notes that "authorities held Hui individuals in formaldetention and mass internment camps in Xinjiang for actions related to Islamthat are protected under international law" (US 29 Mar. 2021, 4).
Sources report the following reasons for detention of Hui individuals:
advocating for religious freedom for Muslims (US 29 Mar. 2021, 4);
reading the Quran in a mosque (US 29 Mar. 2021, 4);
teaching the Quran via WeChat (US 29 Mar. 2021, 4);
organizing an Islamic funeral (FP 10 Feb. 2020);
viewing religious content online (FP 10 Feb. 2020);
sharing online materials relating to the Quran (US 29 Mar. 2021, 5);
criticizing the mistreatment of Chinese Muslims by authorities (RFA 27 Jan.2020);
purchasing Islamic books (NPR 21 Nov. 2020);
building a mosque (FP 10 Feb. 2020); and
performing the Hajj, the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (NPR 26 Sept. 2019).

高级研究员表示，当局“虐待”回族穆斯林，并“日益”剥夺他们的宗教信仰自由权，尤其是在新疆和宁夏（CHRD 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。同一消息来源还指出，在新疆和宁夏，人们受到监控，不允许离开该国，因为他们必须将护照交给当局（CHRD 2022 年 9 月 20 日）。同一消息来源进一步指出，在“过去几年”，回族穆斯林“经常”受到警方的骚扰或拘留，其中“警方行动的极端性”在新疆最为严重（CHRD 2022 年9 月 20 日）。 NPR 还指出，自 2019 年 4 月以来，“与新疆镇压维吾尔族穆斯林之前相同的限制现在也出现在回族聚居地区”，强制翻修或关闭回族清真寺、拆除学校、监禁宗教社区领袖，以及“越来越多”的国际回族被拘留（NPR 2019 年9 月 26 日）。据法新社报道，临夏的回族穆斯林现在担心“类似的监视和镇压”，就像以前新疆的维吾尔族人所经历的那样（法新社 2020 年 4 月 1 日）。同样，FP也指出，回族穆斯林“非常害怕成为继维吾尔族之后的下一个受害者”，回族穆斯林已经受到“反清真”团体的“攻击”（FP 2019 年 1 月 5 日）。
美国国会及行政当局中国委员会的报告指出，“新疆的回族人士因与伊斯兰教有关的行为而遭当局正式拘留和关进大规模拘留营，而这些行为受到国际法保护”（美国，2021 年 3 月 29 日，第 4 页）。
据消息来源报道，拘留回族人士的原因如下：
倡导穆斯林的宗教自由（美国2021年3月29日，4）；
在清真寺里读《古兰经》（美国2021年3月29日，4）；
通过微信教授《古兰经》（美国2021年3月29日，4）；
组织伊斯兰葬礼（FP 2020 年 2 月 10 日）；
在线观看宗教内容（FP 2020 年 2 月 10 日）；
分享与《古兰经》相关的在线资料（美国2021年3月29日，5）；
批评当局虐待中国穆斯林 (自由亚洲电台 2020 年 1 月 27 日)；
购买伊斯兰书籍（NPR 2020 年 11 月 21 日）；
建造一座清真寺（FP 2020 年 2 月 10 日）；

以及参加麦加朝觐（NPR，2019 年 9 月 26 日）。

Foreign Affairs, a magazine on American foreign policy andinternational affairs published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),"a non-profit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated toimproving the understanding of U.S. foreign policy and internationalaffairs" (Foreign Affairs n.d.), reports that repression "seems to bespreading beyond Xinjiang to Hui communities in other parts of China, whereauthorities are tearing down Islamic domes, removing Arabic-language signs, andsilencing the outdoor call to prayer" (Foreign Affairs 7 Jan. 2019). Thesame source states that Muslims are "essentially secularized byforce" at "reeducation camps" (Foreign Affairs 7 Jan. 2019).According to NPR, Hui Muslims whose identity documents were registered inXinjiang while they were living outside that region have also been sent toXinjiang's prisons or re-education camps (NPR 21 Nov. 2020). NPR reports thataccording to Hui residents of Tongxin, local officials are offering rewardsbetween US$700 and US$2,820 to individuals "who report suspiciousreligious behavior, such as proselytizing Islam or secretly teaching Islamictexts" (NPR 26 Sept. 2019).

《外交事务》是一本关于美国外交政策和国际事务的杂志，由外交关系委员会 (CFR) 出版，该委员会是“一个致力于增进对美国外交政策和国际事务理解的非营利和无党派会员组织”（《外交事务》第 2 期），该杂志报道称，镇压“似乎正在从新疆蔓延到中国其他地区的回族社区，当局正在拆除伊斯兰教的圆顶建筑，移除阿拉伯语标志，并禁止户外祈祷”（《外交事务》2019 年 1 月 7 日）。同一消息来源指出，穆斯林在“再教育营”中“基本上被强制世俗化”（《外交事务》 2019 年 1 月 7 日）。据 NPR 报道，回族穆斯林在新疆以外居住时，其身份证件在新疆登记，他们也被送往新疆的监狱或再教育营（NPR 2020 年 11 月 21 日）。 NPR 报道称，据同心回族居民称，当地官员向“举报可疑宗教行为，如宣扬伊斯兰教或秘密教授伊斯兰教经文”的个人提供 700 至 2,820 美元的奖励（NPR，2019 年 9 月 26 日）。

消息来源：加拿大政府IRB